Abstract. This is a survey about continuous time deterministic evolutionary dynamics for finite games. In particular, six basic dynamics are described: the replicator dynamics, the best response dynamics, the Brown-von NeumannNash dynamics, the Smith dynamics, and the payoff projection dynamics. Special classes of games, such as stable games, supermodular games and partnership games are discussed. Finally a general nonconvergence result is presented.
Introduction: Evolutionary Games
We consider a large population of players, with a finite set of pure strategies {1, . . . , n}. x i denotes the frequency of strategy i. Δ n = {x ∈ R n : x i ≥ 0, n i=1 x i = 1} is the (n − 1)-dimensional simplex which will often be denoted by Δ if there is no confusion.
The payoff to strategy i in a population x is a i (x), with a i : Δ → R a continuous function (population game). The most important special case is that of a symmetric two person game with n × n payoff matrix A = (a ij ); with random matching this leads to the linear payoff function a i (x) = j a ij x j = (Ax) i .
x ∈ Δ is a Nash equilibrium (NE) iff (1.1)x·a(x) ≥ x·a(x) ∀x ∈ Δ.
Occasionally I will also look at bimatrix games (played between two player populations), with n × m payoff matrices A, B, or at N person games.
Evolutionarily stable strategies. According to Maynard Smith [36] , a mixed strategyx ∈ Δ is an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) if (i) x·Ax ≤x·Ax ∀x ∈ Δ, and (ii) x·Ax <x·Ax for x =x, if there is equality in (i).
The first condition (i) is simply Nash's definition (1.1) for an equilibrium. It is easy to see thatx is an ESS, iffx·Ax > x·Ax holds for all x =x in a neighbourhood ofx. This property is called locally superior in [61] . For an interior equilibrium x, the equilibrium conditionx·Ax = x·Ax for all x ∈ Δ together with (ii) implies (x − x)·A(x −x) > 0 for all x and hence (1.2) z ·Az < 0 ∀z ∈ R n 0 = {z ∈ R n : i z i = 0} with z = 0.
Condition (1.2) says that the mean payoff x·Ax is a strictly concave function on Δ. Conversely, games satisfying (1.2) have a unique ESS (possibly on the boundary) which is also the unique Nash equilibrium of the game. The slightly weaker condition (1.3) z ·Az ≤ 0 ∀z ∈ R n 0 includes also the limit cases of zero-sum games and games with an interior equilibrium that is a 'neutrally stable' strategy (i.e., equality is allowed in (ii)). Games satisfying (1.3) need no longer have a unique equilibrium, but the set of equilibria is still a nonempty convex subset of Δ.
For the rock-scissors-paper game with (a cyclic symmetric) pay-off matrix Hence for 0 < b < a, the game is negative definite, and E is an ESS. On the other hand, if 0 < a < b, the game is positive definite:
(1.5) z ·Az > 0 ∀z ∈ R n 0 \ {0}, the equilibrium E is not evolutionarily stable, indeed the opposite, and might be called an 'anti-ESS'.
For a classical game theorist, all RPS games are the same. There is a unique Nash equilibrium, even a unique correlated equilibrium [60] , for any a, b > 0. In evolutionary game theory the dichotomy a < b versus a > b is crucial, as we will see in the next sections, in particular in the figures 1-6.
Game Dynamics
In this section I present 6 special (families of) game dynamics. As we will see they enjoy a particularly nice property: Interior ESS are globally asymptotically stable.
The presentation follows largely [ Replicator dynamics.
In the zero-sum version a = b of the RSP game, all interior orbits are closed, circling around the interior equilibrium E, with x 1 x 2 x 3 as a constant of motion. 
Since best replies are in general not unique, this is a differential inclusion rather than a differential equation. For continuous payoff functions a i (x) the right hand side is a non-empty convex, compact subset of Δ which is upper semi-continuous in x. Hence solutions exist, and they are Lipschitz functions x(t) satisfying (2.2) for almost all t ≥ 0, see [1] . For games with linear payoff, solutions can be explicitely constructed as piecewise linear functions, see [9, 19, 27, 53] .
For interior NE of linear games we have the following stability result [19] . Let B = {b ∈ bdΔ n : (Ab) i = (Ab) j for all i, j ∈ supp(b)} denote the set of all rest points of (REP) on the boundary. Then the function The proof consists in showing that the function V from (b) decreases along the solutions of the BR dynamics (2.2).
In the rock-scissors-paper game the set B reduces to the set of pure strategies, the Lyapunov function is simply V (x) = max i (Ax) i and satisfiesV = −V (except at the NE), see [13] . Since min x∈Δ V (x) = V (x) =x·Ax = a−b 3 > 0 the exponentially decreasing V (x(t)) reaches this minimum value after a finite time. So all orbits reach the NE in finite time.
If p ∈ int Δ is an interior ESS then condition (a) holds not only for all b ∈ B but for all b = p. In this case the Lyapunov function V (x) = max i (Ax) i − x·Ax ≥ 0 can also be used. This leads to Proof. The Lyapunov function V (x) = max i (Ax) i − x·Ax ≥ 0 satisfiesV = x·Aẋ −ẋ·Ax < 0 along piecewise linear solutions outside the set of NE.
Note that for zero-sum games,V = −V , so V (x(t)) = e −t V (x(0)) → 0 as t → ∞, so x(t) converges to the set of NE. For negative definite games,V < −c − V for some c > 0 and hence x(t) reaches the NE in finite time.
For positive definite RSP games (b > a), V (x) = max i (Ax) i still satisfieṡ V = −V . Hence the NE is a repeller and all orbits (except the constant one at the NE) converge to the set where V (x) = max i (Ax) i = 0 which is a closed orbit under the BR dynamics. It is called the Shapley triangle of the game, as a tribute to [52] , see figure 2 (right). In this case the equilibrium payoff a−b 3 is smaller than 0, the payoff for a tie. This is the intuitive reason why the population tries to get away from the NE and closer to the pure states.
Interestingly, the times averages of the solutions of the replicator dynamics approach for b > a the very same Shapley triangle, see [13] . The general reason for this is explained in Sorin's chapter [56, ch. 3] .
For similar cyclic games with n = 4 strategies several Shapley polygons can coexist, see [16] . For n ≥ 5 chaotic dynamics is likely to occur.
Smoothed best replies. The BR dynamics can be approximated by smooth dynamics such as the logit dynamics [5, 12, 31]
j e u j . with ε > 0. As ε → 0, this approaches the best reply dynamics, and every family of rest points 5x ε accumulates in the set of Nash equilibria. There are (at least) two ways to motivate and generalize this 'smoothing'. Whereas BR(x) is the set of maximizers of the linear function z → i z i a i (x) on Δ, consider b εv (x), the unique maximizer of the function z → i z i a i (x) + εv(z) on int Δ, where v : int Δ → R is a strictly concave function such that |v (z)| → ∞ as z approaches the boundary of Δ. If v is the entropy − z i log z i , the corresponding smoothed best reply dynamics
reduces to the logit dynamics (2.4) above [12] . Another choice 6 is v(x) = i log x i used by Harsányi [17] in his logarithmic games.
Another way to perturb best replies are stochastic perturbations. Let ε be a random vector in R n distributed according to some positive density function. For
and b(x) = C(a(x)) the resulting stochastically perturbed best reply function. It can be shown [23] that each such stochastic perturbation can be represented by a deterministic perturbation as described before. The main idea is that there is a 
is the logit choice function and we obtain (2.4).
Theorem 2.4. [22] In a negative semidefinite game (1.3), the smoothed BR dynamics (2.5) (including the logit dynamics) has a unique equilibriumx ε . It is globally asymptotically stable.
The proof uses the Lyapunov function
I will return to these perturbed dynamics in section 5. For more information on the logit dynamics see Sorin's chapter [56] and references therein, and [43] .
The Brown-von Neumann-Nash dynamics. The Brown-von NeumannNash dynamics (BNN) is defined as
(with u + = max(u, 0)) denotes the positive part of the excess payoff for strategy i. This dynamics is closely related to the continuous map f : Δ → Δ defined by
which Nash [41] used (for h = 1) to prove the existence of equilibria, by applying Brouwer's fixed point theorem: It is easy to see thatx is a fixed point of f iff it is a rest point of (2.7) iffâ i (x) = 0 for all i, i.e. iffx is a Nash equilibrium of the game.
Rewriting the Nash map (2.9) as a difference equation, and taking the limit lim h→0 f (x)−x h yields (2.7). This differential equation was considered earlier by Brown and von Neumann [7] in the special case of zero-sum games, for which they proved global convergence to the set of equilibria.
In contrast to the best reply dynamics, the BNN dynamics (2.7) is Lipschitz (if payoffs are Lipschitz) and hence has unique solutions. Equation (2.7) defines an 'innovative better reply' dynamics. A strategy not present that is a best (or at least a better) reply against the current population will enter the population. Dynamics based on pairwise comparison. The BNN dynamics is a prototype of an innovative dynamics. A more natural way to derive innovative dynamics is the following,
in the form of an input-output dynamics. Here x i ρ ij is the flux from strategy i to strategy j, and ρ ij = ρ ij (x) ≥ 0 is the rate at which an i player switches to the j strategy. A natural assumption on the revision protocol 7 ρ is
Here switching to any better reply is possible, as opposed to the BR dynamics where switching is only to the optimal strategies (usually there is only one of them), or the BNN dynamics where switching occurs only to strategies better than the population average. An important special case is when the switching rate depends on the payoff difference only, i.e., (2.11)
where φ is a function with φ(u) > 0 for u > 0 and φ(u) = 0 for u ≤ 0. The resulting dynamics (2.10) is called pairwise comparison dynamics. The natural choice seems φ(u) = u + , given by the proportional rule
The resulting pairwise difference dynamics (PD)
was introduced by Michael J. Smith [55] in the transportation literature as a dynamic model for congestion games. He also proved the following global stability result.
Theorem 2.6.
[55] For a negative semidefinite game (1.3), the convex set of its equilibria is globally asymptotically stable for the PD dynamics (2.13). 7 All the basic dynamics considered so far can be written in the form (2.10) with a suitable revision protocol ρ (with some obvious modification in the case of the multi-valued BR dynamics). Given the revision protocol ρ, the payoff function a, and a finite population size N , there is a natural finite population model in terms of a Markov process on the grid {x ∈ Δ : Nx ∈ Z n }. The differential equation (2.10) provides a very good approximation of the behavior of this stochastic process, at least over finite time horizons and for large population sizes. For all this see Sandholm's chapter [49] .
The proof uses the Lyapunov function
, by showing V (x) ≥ 0 and V (x) = 0 iff x is a NE, and
except at NE. This result extends to pairwise comparison dynamics (2.10,2.11), see [24] .
The payoff projection dynamics. A more recent proof of the existence of Nash equilibria, due to Gül-Pearce-Stacchetti [15] uses the payoff projection map
Here h > 0 is fixed and Π Δ : R n → Δ is the projection onto the simplex Δ, assigning to each vector u ∈ R n the point in the compact convex set Δ which is closest to u. Now Π Δ (z) = y iff for all x ∈ Δ, the angle between x − y and z − y is obtuse, i.e., iff (x − y)·(z − y) ≤ 0 for all x ∈ Δ. Hence, P hx =x iff for all x ∈ Δ, (x −x)·a(x) ≤ 0, i.e., iffx is a Nash equilibrium. Since the map P h : Δ → Δ is continuous Brouwer's fixed point theorem implies the existence of a Nash equilibrium.
Writing this map as a difference equation, we obtain in the limit h → 0 (2.14)ẋ = lim
being the cone of feasible directions at x into Δ. This is the payoff projection dynamics (PP) of Lahkar and Sandholm [34] . The latter equality in (2.14) and its dynamic analysis use some amount of convex analysis, in particular the Moreau decomposition, see [1, 34] .
For x ∈ int Δ we obtainẋ
which, for a linear game, is simply a linear dynamics. It appeared in many places as a suggestion for a simple game dynamics, but how to treat this on the boundary has been rarely dealt with. Indeed, the vector field (2.14) is discontinuous on bd Δ. However, essentially because P h is Lipschitz, solutions exist for all t ≥ 0 and are unique (in forward time). This can be shown by rewriting (2.14) as a viability problem in terms of the normal cone ([1, 34])
Theorem 2.7.
[34] In a negative definite game (1.2), the unique NE is globally asymptotically stable for the payoff projection dynamics (2.14).
The proof uses as Lyapunov function the Euclidean distance to the equilibrium Summary. As we have seen many of the special dynamics are related to maps that have been used to prove existence of Nash equilibria. The best response dynamics, the perturbed best response dynamics, and the BNN dynamics correspond to the three proofs given by Nash himself: [39, 40, 41] . The payoff projection dynamics is related to [15] . Even the replicator dynamics can be used to provide such a proof, if only after adding a mutation term, see [26, 27] , or Sigmund's chapter [53, (11. 3)]:
with ε i > 0 describing mutation rates.
Moreover, there is a result analogous to Theorem 2.4. 
with equality only at x =x. Hence L is a Lyapunov function forx, and hencex is globally asymptotically stable (w.r.t. int Δ).
The six basic dynamics described so far enjoy the following common properties. 1. The unique NE of a negative definite game (in particular, any interior ESS) is globally asymptotically stable.
2. Interior NE of a positive definite game ('anti-ESS') are repellors.
Because of the nice behaviour of negative (semi-)definite games with respect to these basic dynamics, Sandholm christened them stable games.
For nonlinear games in a single population these are games whose payoff func-
Examples are congestion games [48] , the war of attrition [36] , the sex-ratio game [36] , the habitat selection game [10] , or simply the nonlinear payoff function a(x) = Ax + φ(x) in (2.16). The global stability theorems 2.1, 2.3, 2.4, 2.5, 2.6, 2.14 hold for general stable N population games, see [24, 48] .
Bimatrix games
The replicator dynamics for an n × m bimatrix game (A, B) readṡ
For its properties see [26, 27] and especially [21] . N person games are treated in [61] and [44] . The best reply dynamics for bimatrix games reads
See Sorin [56, section 1] for more information.
For 2 × 2 games the state space [0, 1] 2 is two-dimensional and one can completely classify the dynamic behaviour. There are four robust cases for the replicator dynamics, see [26, 27] , and additionally 11 degenerate cases. Some of these degenerate cases arise naturally as extensive form games, such as the Entry Deterrence Game, see Cressman's chapter [10] . A complete analysis including all phase portraits are presented in [9] for (BR) and (REP), and in [46] for the BNN and the Smith dynamics.
For bimatrix games, stable games include zero-sum games, but not much more. We call an n × m bimatrix game (A, B) a rescaled zero-sum game [26, 27] 
or equivalently, there exists an n × m matrix C, α i , β j ∈ R and γ > 0 s.t. [10] . However, for larger n, m this is a thin set of games, e.g. for 3 × 3 games, this set has codimension 3.
For such rescaled zero-sum games, the set of Nash equilibria is stable for (REP), (BR) and the other basic dynamics.
One of the main open problems in evolutionary game dynamics concerns the converse.
Conjecture 3.1. Let (p, q) be an isolated interior equilibrium of a bimatrix game (A, B), which is stable for the BR dynamics or for the replicator dynamics. Then n = m and (A, B) is a rescaled zero sum game.

Dominated Strategies
A pure strategy i (in a single population game with payoff function a : Δ → R n ) is said to be strictly dominated if there exists some y ∈ Δ such that
for all x ∈ Δ. A rational player will not use such a strategy. In the best response dynamics,ẋ i = −x i and hence x i (t) → 0 as t → ∞. Similarly, for the replicator dynamics, L(x) = log x i − k y k log x k satisfieṡ L(x) < 0 for x ∈ int Δ and hence x i (t) → 0 along all interior orbits of (REP).
A similar result holds for extensions of (REP), given by differential equations of the form
where the functions g i satisfy x i g i (x) = 0 on Δ. The simplex Δ and its faces are invariant. Such an equation is said to be payoff monotonic [61] if for any i, j, and
All dynamics arising from an imitative revision protocol have this property. For such payoff monotonic dynamics, if the pure strategy i is strictly dominated by another pure strategy j, i.e., a i (x) < a j (x) for all x ∈ Δ then
x i x j goes monotonically to zero, and hence x i (t) → 0. However, if the dominating strategy is mixed, this need no longer be true, see [20, 30] .
The situation is even worse for all other basic dynamics from section 2, in particular, (BNN), (PD) and (PP). As shown in [4, 25, 34] there are games with a pure strategy i being strictly dominated by another pure strategy j such that i survives in the long run, i.e., lim inf t→+∞ x i (t) > 0 for an open set of initial conditions.
Supermodular Games and Monotone Flows
An interesting class of games are the supermodular games (also known as games with strict strategic complementarities [59] ). They make use of the natural order among pure strategies and are defined by
where a i,j = a ij are the entries of the payoff matrix A. This means that for any i < n, a i+1,k − a ik increases strictly with k.
In the case of n = 2 strategies this reduces to a 22 − a 21 − a 12 + a 11 > 0, which means that the game is positive definite (1.5). In particular, every bistable 2 × 2 game is supermodular.
For n ≥ 3 there is no simple relation between supermodular games and positive definite games, although they share some properties, such as the instability of interior NE. For example, the RPS game with b > a is positive definite but not supermodular. Indeed, a supermodular game cannot have a best reply cycle among the pure strategies, see below. On the other hand, an n × n pure coordination game (where the payoff matrix is a positive diagonal matrix) is positive definite, but supermodular only if n = 2.
Stochastic dominance defines a partial order on the simplex Δ:
If all inequalities in (5.2) are strict, we write p p . The intuition is that p has more mass to the right than p . This partial order extends the natural order on the pure strategies:
Here k is identified with the kth unit vector, i.e., a corner of Δ.
Lemma 5.1. Let (u k ) be an increasing sequence, and x y. Then
The proof follows easily from Abel summation (the discrete analog of integration by parts):
Lemma 5.2. For i < j and x y, x = y:
Proof. Take u k = a jk − a ik as strictly increasing sequence in the previous lemma.
The crucial property of supermodular games is the monotonicity of the best reply correspondence. The extreme strategies 1 and n are either strictly dominated strategies or pure Nash equilibria.
There are no best reply cycles: Every sequence of pure strategies which is sequential best replies is finally constant and ends in a pure NE.
For results on the convergence of fictitious play and the best response dynamics in supermodular games see [3, 32] . Proof. W.l.o.g., we can assume that the equilibriumx is interior (otherwise restrict to a face). A supermodular game satisfies a ij + a ji < a ii + a jj for all i = j (set x = i, y = j in (5.3) ). Hence, if we normalize the game by a ii = 0, x·Ax = i,j (a ij + a ji )x ixj < 0. Now it is shown in [27, p.164 ] that −x·Ax equals the trace of the Jacobian of (REP) atx, i.e., the sum of all its eigenvalues. Hence at least one of the eigenvalues has positive real part, andx is unstable.
For different instability results of mixed equilibria see [11] . The following is a generalization of Theorem 5.3 to perturbed best replies, due to [23] . I present here a different proof. 
and for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
Proof. It is sufficient to show that the perturbed best reponse map is strongly monotone:
x y, x = y ⇒ C(Ax) ≺ C(Ay) From Lemma 5.2 we know: If x y, x = y then (Ay − Ax) i increases strictly in i. Hence, with a = Ax and b = Ay, it remains to show:
This means that for each k: [54] ) implies that almost all solutions of (5.6) converge to a rest point of (5.6).
It seems that the other basic dynamics do not respect the stochastic dominance order (5.2). They do not generate a monotone flow for every supermodular game.
Still there is the open problem Problem 5.7. In a supermodular game, do almost all orbits of (BR), (REP), (BNN), (PD), (PP) converge to a NE?
For the best reponse dynamics this entails to extend the theory of monotone flows to cover discontinuous differential equations or differential inclusions.
Partnership games and general adjustment dynamics
We consider now games with a symmetric payoff matrix A = A T (a ij = a ji for all i, j). Such games are known as partnership games [26, 27] and potential games [38] . The basic population genetic model of Fisher and Haldane is equivalent to the replicator dynamics for such games, which is then a gradient system with respect to the Shahshahani metric and the mean payoff x·Ax as potential, see e.g. [26, 27] . The resulting increase of mean fitness or mean payoff x·Ax in time is often referred to as the Fundamental Theorem of Natural Selection. This statement about the replicator dynamics generalizes to the other dynamics considered here.
The generalization is based on the concept, defined by Swinkels [58] , of a (myopic) adjustment dynamics which satisfiesẋ·Ax ≥ 0 for all x ∈ Δ, with equality only at equilibria. If A = A T then the mean payoff x·Ax is increasing for every adjustment dynamics since (x · Ax) · = 2ẋ · Ax ≥ 0. It is obvious that the best response dynamics (2.2) is an adjustment dynamics and it is easy to see that the other special dynamics from section 2 are as well.
As a consequence, we obtain the following result. Generically, equilibria are isolated. Then the above result implies convergence for each trajectory. Still, continua of equilibria occur in many interesting applications, see e.g. [45] . Even in this case, it is known that every trajectory of the replicator dynamics converges to a rest point, and hence each interior trajectory converges to a Nash equilibrium, see e.g. [26, ch. 23.4] For bimatrix games the adjustment property is defined aṡ
A bimatrix game is a partnership/potential game if A = B, i.e., if both players obtain the same payoff [26, ch. 27.2] . Then the potential x·Ay increases monotonically along every solution of every adjustment dynamics.
For the general situation of potential games between N populations with nonlinear payoff functions see [48] .
A universal Shapley example
The simplest example of persistent cycling in a game dynamics is probably the RSP game (1.4) with b > a for the BR dynamics (2.2) which leads to a triangular shaped limit cycle, see figure 1 (right). Historically, Shapley [52] gave the first such example in the context of 3 × 3 bimatrix games (but it is less easy to visualize because of the 4d state space). Our six basic dynamics show a similar cycling behavior for positive definite RSP games.
But given the huge pool of adjustment dynamics, we now ask: Is there an evolutionary dynamics, which converges for each game from each initial condition to an equilibrium? Such a dynamics is assumed to be given by a differential equation
such that f depends continuously on the population state x and the payoff function a.
For N player binary games (each player chooses between two strategies only) general evolutionary dynamics are easy to describe: The better of the two strategies increases, the other one decreases, i.e., (7.2) 
holds for all i at all (interior) states. Here x ij denotes the frequency of strategy j used by player i, and a i (j, x −i ) his payoff. In a common interest game where each player has the same payoff function P (x), along solutions x(t), P (x(t)) increases monotonically:
A familiy of 2 × 2 × 2 games. Following [29] , we consider 3 players, each with 2 pure strategies. The payoffs are summarized in the usual way as follows. The first player (left payoff) chooses the row, the second chooses the column, the third (right payoff) chooses one of the matrices. For ε = 0, this game has a unique equilibrium E = The minimum value of P is −1 which is attained at the two pure profiles 111 and 222. At the interior equilibrium E, its value is P (E) = − 1 4 . P attains its maximum value 0 at the set Γ of all profiles, where two players use opposite pure strategies, whereas the remaining player may use any mixture. All points in Γ are Nash equilibria. Small perturbations in the payoffs (ε = 0) can destroy this component of equilibria.
For every natural dynamics, P (x(t)) increases. If P (x(0)) > P (E) = − 1 4 then P (x(t)) → 0 and x(t) → Γ. Hence Γ is an attractor (an asymptotically stable invariant set) for the dynamics, for ε = 0.
For small ε > 0, there is an attractor Γ ε near Γ whose basin contains the set {x : P (x) > − 1 4 + γ(ε)}, with γ(ε) → 0, as ε → 0. This follows from the fact that attractors are upper-semicontinuous against small perturbations of the dynamics (for proofs of this fact see, e.g., [25, 2] ). But for ε > 0, the only equilibrium is E.
Hence we have shown Similar examples can be given as 4 × 4 symmetric one population games, see [27] , and 3×3 bimatrix games, see [29] . The proofs follow the same lines: For ε = 0 these are potential games, the potential maximizer is a quadrangle or a hexagon, and this component of NE disappears for ε = 0 but continues to a nearby attractor for the dynamics.
